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Some investigators have suggested that when material becomes more
complex, an individual is forced to use an intuitive process, while
others suggest that increasing complexity forces analysis.

This study
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was an attempt to resolve this question by manipulating rate of
presentation and instructions.

No effect was found due to these

manipulations or due to complexity.

The reason is not clear, but may be

due to a combination of factors which inclined the experiment in the
direction of the intuitive process.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTUITIVE AND ANALYTIC PROCESSES
Intuition is widely claimed to be an important mode of knowing.
Discussions of intuition usually contrast it with analysis.
Bruner (1960) characterized intuitive thinking as not advancing in
well-defined steps but tending to involve maneuvers based on an implicit
perception of the total problem and arriving at the answer with little
awareness of the process.

Analytic thinking, in contrast, proceeds a

step at a time and with relatively full awareness.

Heidbreder (1946)

described behavior which she calls "spQctator behavior."

In spectator

behavior, a subject does not deal with individual attributes but
develops an impression of what a positive instance looks like without
stating a rule.

This she contrasts with "participant" behavior, in

which a subject guesses which are the correct attributes and tests the
guesses against experience, with a strong tendency to believe there is
an underlying rule.
Neisser (1963) compared holistic (intuitive) with sequential
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(analytic) processes in the context of differences between human thought
and artificial intelligence.

Multiple (holistic) processing, found in

humans but not characteristic of computers, asks all the questions at
once.

According to Neisser, it is effective in the face of ambiguous

cues and is not seriously affected by internal errors.

A sequential

process, on the other hand, goes consecutively from one decision to
another.

It can go astray if a wrong decision is made and so is less

effective in the face of error, as this increases the chances of a wrong
decision.

Hammond (1981) similarly described the intuitive process as

responsive to many contemporaneous cues, working rapidly and
unconsciously, substituting cues and strategies to produce solutions at
least approximately correct.
cues are perceptual.
and evaluated.

It is more likely to be employed when the

Analytic task strategies are consciously executed

Analysis is likely to occur when the cues are not

perceptual, but symbolic (Hammond, 1981).

Peters, Hammond, and Summers

(1974) found that intuitive processes are likely to lead to small
errors, while analytic processes are likely to lead either to no errors
or to very large errors.
Hammond's (1981) analysis of intuition-inducing and analysisinducing task conditions indicates that intuition is induced by tasks
which are continuous rather than discrete, and where the subject
measures the cue levels (as opposed to having the cue levels measured
for him/her).

In these terms, intuition is induced by complexity.

Intuition is also induced by speeded tasks.
measure of complexity.

This introduces a temporal
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PROBLEM COMPLEXITY AND PROCESSING MODE
This paper is concerned with a major disagreement in theory and
data about the relative efficiency and effectiveness of the two
processes.

According to one point of view, when material is complicated

and difficult to deal with, an individual is forced to proceed
intuitively.

According to the other, under these same circumstances, an

individual must proceed analytically to make progress.

Theories differ

regarding what conditions lead to intuition or analysis, and under what
circumstances intuitive or analytical processes are more effective.
A number of thinkers and investigators have suggested that when the
material under consideration becomes very difficult to process, an
individual turns to intuition.

Reed (1946) found that when subjects

attempted to learn a concept for classifying nonsense words, they
reverted to rote memory in highly complex situations.

Katona (1967)

asserted that memorizing is resorted to under circumstances which are
not suitable to understanding and in which organization reaches its
limit.

(There is presumably some overlap between rote memory and

intuition, although the degree of this overlap is not established.)
Peterson and Beach (1967), in a review of literature comparing the
performance of "intuitive man" with "statistical man," discuss evidence
from different types of experiments where greater task complexity (more
cues available) appears to lead to more nearly optimal performance by
subjects.

These are judgments of covariation between multivalent, as

opposed to bivalent, variables and with multiple, as opposed to single,
predictors.
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According to de Groot (1965), chess masters simultaneously consider

many facts, making continuous re-evaluations at greater depth in a given
situation.

They depend heavily on their own intuition to deal with the

very complex situations in competition play or in playing many games
simultaneously (Hearst, 1969).

Newell and Simon's (1972) chess experts

solved chess problems in much the same way.

A "large number of patterns

serve as an index to guide the expert in a fraction of a second to
relevant parts of the knowledge store" (Larkin, McDermott, Simon and
Simon, 1980).
Osler and Trautman (1961) found that in learning a simple concept
(the number two), irrelevant stimulus dimensions such as color, shape,
and other physical characteristics had no effect on the learning of
subjects assumed to be using associative (intuitive) learning.
A second group of researchers has argued that, as the material
under consideration becomes very difficult to process, an individual is
forced to turn to analysis.
Rees and Israel (1935) found that only in short anagrams were
subjects able to solve the anagrams all at once (holistically or
intuitively).

In longer anagrams, they were forced to analyze.

The very point of judgment and decision analysis is to improve
performance by applying analysis to problems too complex for intuition.
The spirit of decomposition is to divide and conquer; decompose
a complex problem into simpler problems, get one's thinking
straight in these simpler problems [and] paste these analyses
together with a logical glue. (Raiffa, 1968)
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Some research indicates that decomposition does, indeed, improve

judgment (Armstrong, Denniston, and Gordon, 1975; Gettys, Michel,
Steiger, Kelley, and Petersen, 1973; Edwards, Phillips, Hays, and
Goodman, 1968; Kaplan and Newman, 1966; Schum, Southard, and Wombolt,
1969).
Because the individuals on the two sides of this question were
looking at very different materials and defining various aspects of
their work in different ways, it is difficult to know how to bring their
findings to bear on the question of whether intuition or analysis is
better suited to processing very complex material, or what circumstances
lead to using intuition or analysis successfully.

An understanding of

which process is more appropriate could lead to more effective
performance in many areas.
"Complexity" has been variously defined in tenns of (a) the number
of variables, (b) the number of relevant variables, or (c) complexity of
the logical statement relating the relevant variables.

Many

investigators mentioned that they look at the effects of various numbers
of variables, but do not always distinguish whether they are relevant or
irrelevant, or even specify the number of variables considered.

One

exception to this policy may be seen in the cases of Hull (1920) and
Osler and Trautman (1961).

Both studies considered complexity in tenns

of number of irrelevant variables.

Hull (1920) found that the simpler

stimuli (characters similar to Chinese ideographs), involving fewer
irrelevant cues, produced much more efficient concept development than
the complex ones, which contained more irrelevant material.

Osler and
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Trautman (1961), on the other· hand found that irrelevant sti.mulus
dtmensions had no effect on those subjects assumed to be ustng
associative learning.
The apparent contradiction between the findings of Hull (1920) and
those of Osler and Trautman {1961) provides a convenient place to begin
a comparison of intuitive and analytic processes:

How does the number

of irrelevant variables affect efficiency or effectiveness of learning
in intuitive and analytic modes of processing?
This question will be explored in a comparison of the two
processes, using visual stimuli.

An attempt will be made to mantpulate

intuition and analysis by varying (a) rate of presentation (rapid vs.
self-paced) and (b) instructions {learn to classify stimuli vs. discover
a rule for classifying sti·mul i).

This assumes that intui,tion is rapid

(Hammond, 1981; de Groot, 1965; Larkin, McDermott, Simon and Stmon,
1980; Neisser, 1963) without the need to learn a rule (Hammond, 1981;

Heidbreder, 1946; Bruner, 1960) and that analysi:s is allowed when time
and instructions allow for finding a rule (Peters, Hammond, and Summers,
1974; Ha11111ond, 1981; Heidbreder, 1946; Neisser, 1963; Bruner, 1960).
This would allow the same stimuli: to be used i.n both processes, so that
process effectiveness and efficiency might be accurately compared.
As a basis for this comparison, perfonnance will be measured by the

number of responses required to reach a predetennined criterion on
learntng"

The criterion will be based on the ability to transfer

learning to newly-presented stimuli.
In addition, the subject's confidence in each response will be
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recorded.

Bartlett (1958) suggests that subjects show overconfidence in

intuition and underconfidence in analysis, while Hammond (1981) suggests
that

subje~ts

show greater confidence in the process of analysis but

greater confidence in the product of intuition.

This measure reflects

the subject's confidence in the product--his decision.
The subject's ability to verbalize the rule used to identify
stimuli will also be recorded.

Hammond (1981) asserts that verbal

reports are accurate only when the task materials are consciously
manipulated (as in analysis) and that otherwise, there is no structure
for recall and the verbal report is less accurate.

Asking subjects to

verbalize their processes at different points also provides some
information regarding their confidence in the process.
This study should provide answers to two questions:
1.

Is it possible to produce intuitive and analytic learning by
these procedures?

2.

Assuming there is a difference between the intuitive condition
and the analytic condition, what kind of effect does
complexity, as defined here, have on intuitive and analytic
learning processes?

~

(----------------------------------------------------------------------....

CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
SUBJECTS
Subjects were 72 students, consisting of 39 females and 33 males,
recruited from Introductory Psychology classes and offered course credit
for participation.
DESIGN
Subjects were assigned randomly to two groups, 36 to an Analytic
Learning condition (A) and 36 to an Intuitive Learning condition (I).
Each group of 36 was randomly divided into three subgroups (12 per
group).

The three subgroups were presented with stimuli differing in

the number of irrelevant variables.
varying numbers of bars.

These stimuli were bar graphs with

The term "irrelevant variables" refers only to

those bars irrelevant to the classification of the stimulus, not to
other factors the subject might have considered in examining the
stimuli.

Each subject learned one of three possible tasks:

one task

(RI) consisted of learning stimuli with 1 relevant (first bar) and 1
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irrelevant variable; one task (RII) consisted of learning stimuli with 1
relevant (middle bar) and 2 irrelevant variables; and one task (RIII)
consisted of learning stimuli with 1 relevant (fourth bar) and 3
irrelevant variables.
The differences between the intuitive condition and the analytic
condition were:

(a) speed of presentation--Intuitive subjects had

brief exposure to stimuli, while exposure to stimuli for Analytic
subjects was self-paced; and (b) instructions--Intuitive subjects were
asked to learn to classify stimuli, while Analytic subjects were asked
to find a rule to classify stimuli.
Measures of interest were:

(a) the learning curve as reflected by

the proportion of correct responses, the number of different stimuli
seen by the subject, and the total number of resonses made; (b)
confidence ratings, which reflected awareness of the correctness or
incorrectness of the answer; and (c) the ability to verbalize the rule
used to classify stimuli.
APPARATUS
An Ohio Scientific Challenger 2P computer and a monochrome CRT
display were used to present stimuli.

The program, written in BASIC,

selected, randomized, and presented stimuli, in addition to keeping
records of numbers of correct and incorrect responses and mean
confidences for each.
Stimuli were formed from numbers representing the values 0, 1, 2,
3, and 4 for each variable, with all possible combinations present in a
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set from which stimuli were randomly selected for presentation to the

subject.
graph.
(
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Numbers from the set were converted into bar heights on a bar
A stimulus was classified by the program as low ("L") or high

H11 ) according to a specific rule:

"L" was a value of 2 or less for

the relevant variable (less than half the total possible height for a
bar}, and "H" was a value of 3 or more for the relevant variable (more
than half the total possible height for a bar).

Stimuli were centered

on a CRT 7-1/2 inches high and 9-3/4 inches wide.

Presented in a frame,

two-bar graphs were 3-1/2 inches high and 1-7/8 inches wide; three-bar
graphs were 3-1/2 inches high and 2-1/2 inches wide; and four-bar graphs
were

3-1/~

inches high and 3-1/8 inches wide.

Bars within the graph

were 1/2 inch wide with heights varying from 1/4 inch to 2 inches, with
an increment of 1/4 inch between the lowest and the next to lowest
height, followed by increments of 1/2 inch.
approximately 22 inches from the display.

Each subject was seated
Each subject's answer,

confidence rating, and the correct answer were displayed, when
appropriate, on the bottom four lines of the screen.
PROCEDURE
The experiment took place in a room with only the experimenter and
the subject present.

The computer keyboard and the display were on

separate tables, with the experimenter seated in front of the computer
keyboard and the subject seated in front of the display.

The subject

was given instructions appropriate for his/her learning mode, I or A.
The experimenter entered the subject's assigned ID number, which enabled

__J
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the computer to identify the appropriate presentation procedure to
follow for that subject.
Instructions for the Analytic subject:
This is a learning experiment.
pictures that resemble bar graphs.
or High.

You will be looking at

Each picture is called Low

Your task is to learn what each picture is called.

As you learn, new examples will be added to the ones you have
already learned.
There is a rule which detennines in which category, Low
or High, a picture belongs.

In order to make learning easier,

try to detennine the rule which will enable you to place
pictures in their correct category.

Each picture will remain

on the screen for as long as you wish--that is until you give
your answer.
I'll give you two hints to help you.

(1)

If all the

bars are high, the stimulus is a "High," and if all the bars
are low, the stimulus is a "Low."

(2) The order or sequence

in which the stimuli appear is unimportant.

Instructions for the Intuitive subject:
This is a learning experiment.
pictures that resemble bar graphs.
or High.

You will be looking at
Each picture is called Low

Your task is to learn what each pictaure is called.

As you learn, new examples will be added to the ones you have
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already learned.

Each picture will be shown for a brief period of time
before the screen clears.

You will then be asked what that

picture is called (Low or High).
I'll give you two hints to help you.

(1)

If all the

bars are high, the stimulus is a "High, 11 and if a11 the bars
are low, the stimulus is a 11 Low. 11

(2) The order or sequence

in which the stimuli appear is unimportant.

Subjects first learned a practice set of one-bar stimuli consisting
of two runs through all five possible graphs in the same preselected
order for all subjects (total:
11

10 stimuli).

These stimuli were called

L11 and 11 H11 according to the same rule used in the main task.

These

subjects also gave confidence ratings so that they became comfortable
with the procedure.

These subjects were then shown two samples of the

graphs they would be learning (depending on which task condition they
were randomly assigned to:

RI, RII, or Rill).

Each sample remained on

the screen until the experimenter said the correct answer.
point, the subject was not required to make any response.

At this
The two

samples were preselected and presented in the same order for all
subjects in that task condition.

One consisted of all low bars, and the

other of all high bars.
Each subject, whether I or A, was read the following instructions
after his/her first classification response:
Now, I would like you to tell me how likely you think it is
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that your answer is correct.

What I would like you to give me

is an answer between 50% and 100%. If you were just guessing,
you should say 11 50%, 11 because you can be right half the time by
guessing.
11

100%. 11

If you were sure you were right, you should say
If your confidence is somewhere between these two

extremes, you should give an intennediate percentage.

I will

be asking you for such a confidence rating after each response.

The intuitive subject saw a stimulus for .75 second.

The screen

cleared, and the subject was asked to state an answer ( 11 H11 or 11 L11 ) and a
confidence rating.

The correct answer was then displayed below the

subject's responses on an otherwise blank screen.

For the Analytic

subject, each stimulus remained on the screen until the subject gave
his/her answer and confidence rating.

For all subjects (I and A), the

correct answer remained for 1 second before the screen cleared.

At

regular points in the stimulus sequence, the subject was asked "What can
you tell me about 'High' and 'Low'?" The question was indicated on the
display by the words "High and Low?" The subject's responses were
recorded by the experimenter for later examination.

These explanations

provided the data to detennine whether a subject realized at any point
which bars were relevant and irrelevant, and to what extent the subject
was testing different rules to learn, to what point the rules (if any)
were correct, whether the subject was describing visual relationships
between bars or between bars and the frame, or whether the subject said
he/she was guessing.
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In RI, RII, and RIII groups, both I and A subjects learned stimuli

in a part-list/whole-list alternation. At first, three stimuli were
learned to a criterion of one correct response for each.
stimuli were learned to the same criterion.

Then five new

Next, all eight stimuli

were re-presented until a criterion of one correct response each had
been reached.
criterion.

Following that, five new stimuli were learned to

Finally, all thirteen stimuli were re-presented until

criterion had been reached.

This alternation of five new stimuli and

review of the whole list of stimuli seen so far continued until (a) the
subject correctly identified five stimuli the first time they were seen,
at which point the words "Learning Completed" appeared on the screen, or
(b) 15 minutes had elapsed, at which point the experiment was
aribtrarily terminated.
The subject was then thanked for par
leave.

The maximum time for a subject was 30 minutes.

CHAPTER III
RESULTS
PRACTICE TASK
On the 10 stimuli in the practice task, perfonnance was unifonnly
high.

Twenty-eight subjects gave 0 incorrect responses, 28 subjects

gave 1 incorrect response, and 16 subjects gave 2 incorrect responses.
Confidence ratings in the practice runs were generally high for
correct and low for incorrect responses.

Two subjects gave ratings in

the 50% to 75% range, and 70 subjects gave ratings in the 76% to 100%
range for correct answers.

Thirty-six subjects gave ratings in the 50%

to 75% range, and 8 subjects gave ratings in the 75% to 100% range for
incorrect responses.

This excludes those 28 subjects who made no

incorrect responses.
MAIN TASK
Three sets of analyses were perfonned on the data from the main
task.

The first set considered performance.

An analysis of variance

(ANOVA) was perfonned on the proportion of correct responses, the
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dependent variable of principal interest.

In addition, a multivariate

analysis of variance {MANOVA) was perfonned on the proportion of correct
responses, the number of different stimuli learned, and the total number
of responses.

Each of these analyses was performed separately on (a)

all subjects and (b) those subjects who reached criterion.

Table I

shows the mean proportion of correct responses for all subjects, and
Table II shows the ANOVA of these data.

Tables III and IV show the mean

number of different stimuli learned for each group and the mean total
responses of subjects in each group, respectively.

Table V shows the

numbers of subjects reaching criterion, and Tables VI and VII show the
mean proportion of correct responses for subjects reaching criterion and
the ANOVA of these data.
The second set of analyses considered confidence ratings.

A MANOVA

was perfonned on overall confidence and confidence on correct minus
confidence on incorrect responses.

Table VIII shows confidence ratings

on correct and incorrect responses.
The third set of analyses considered strategy.

Each subject was

classified in terms of (a) ability to verbalize the correct rule (Table
IX) and (b) extent of hypothesis testing (Table X).

Finally, the

covariation between ability to verbalize the correct rule and extent of
hypothesis testing was assessed.
Analysis of Perfonnance
Analysis of the data from the main task was performed by means of
MANOVA's (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, Release 7-9, Hull
and Nie, 1981). According to Cochran's and Bartlett's tests, there was
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no significant departure from homogeneity of variance in these data.

Inspection of nonnal and detrended normal plots of the data showed no
departure from reality.
TABLE I
MEAN PROPORTION OF CORRECT RESPONSES (WITH STANDARD DEVIATIONS)
FOR ALL SUBJECTS
2 variables

3 variables

4 variables

Intuitive

.81
(.10)

.74
(.16)

.78
(.10)

Analytic

.80
(.14)

( .11)

.76

.75
(.10)

overall mean = •77, SD = .03 ·

The accompanying ANOVA shows no significant main effect of
intuitive and analytic conditions or of number of irrelevant variables,
or any interaction between intuitive and analytic conditions and the
number of irrelevant variables.
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TABLE II

ANOVA ON PROPORTION OF CORRECT RESPONSES
FOR ALL SUBJECTS

-

F

.E.

.001

.045

.83

1

.020

1.352

.25

.020

1

.020

1.352

.25

I/A x Var, 1st Deriv

.002

1

.002

.143

• 71

I/A x Var, 2nd Deriv

.009

1

.009

.577

.45

ms

SS

df

1.028

71

Within Cells

.976

66

.015

Intuitive/Analytic

.001

1

No. Variables, 1st Deriv

.020

No. Variables, 2nd Deriv

Source
Total

-

TABLE II I
MEAN NUMBER OF DIFFERENT STIMULI LEARNED
2 variables

3 variables

4 variables

Intuitive

17

13

13

Analytic

13

13

11

TABLE IV
MEAN NUMBER OF RESPONSES
2 variables

3

variables

4 variables

Intuitive

52

40

39

Analytic

38

38

29
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A MANOVA considering all subjects, their proportion of correct
responses, number of stimuli learned, and number of responses using
Pillais', Hotellings', Wilks', and Roys' tests (Hull and Nie, 1981, pp.
32-33) produced no significant main effect due to intuitive and analytic
conditions, due to number of irrelevant variables, or due to any
interaction between intuitive and analytic conditions and number of
irrelevant variables.
Fifty-six percent of the total subjects reached the learning
criterion.
TABLE V
NUMBERS OF SUBJECTS REACHING CRITERION
2 variables

3 variables

4 variables

Intuitive

7

7

6

Analytic

7

7

6

TABLE VI
MEAN PROPORTION OF CORRECT RESPONSES (WITH STANDARD DEVIATIONS)
FOR SUBJECTS REACHING CRITERION

Intuitive

Analytic

2 variables

3 variables

.85
(. 08)

.84

.83

(. 09)

( .11)

.80

.80
(.12)

.87

(.14)

( .11)

4 variables
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The weighted mean across levels of complexity for learning of those

subjects who reached criterion (excluding the 5 correct criterion
responses) is 71% for lntuitives and 68% for Analytics.
The accompanying ANOVA, limited to subjects reaching criterion,
shows no significant main effect of intuitive and analytic conditions,
or of number of irrelevant variables, or of any interaction between
intuitive and analytic conditions and the number of irrelevant
variables.
TABLE VII
ANOVA ON PROPORTION OF CORRECT RESPONSES
FOR SUBJECTS REACHING CRITERION
Source
Total

SS

df

-

ms

F

R

.455

39

Within Cells

.428

34

.013

Intuitive/Analytic

.003

1

.003

.209

.65

No. Variables, 1st Deriv

.016

1

.016

1.239

.27

No. Variables, 2nd Deriv

.002

1

.002

.150

.70

I/A x Var, 1st Deriv

.003

1

.003

.223

.64

I/A x Var, 2nd Deriv

.003

1

.003

.198

.66

A MANOVA of the same measures as the earlier MANOVA, but limited to
subjects reaching criterion, produced no significant main effects due to
intuitive and analytic conditions, or due to number of irrelevant
variables, or to any interaction between intuitive and analytic
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conditions and the number of irrelevant variables (using the tests of
Pillais, et al).
Analysis of Confidence
Confidence ratings produced an overall mean of 78%, SD

= 12%.

Confidence in correct answers showed a mean difference of only 11% from
confidence in incorrect responses, with SD

= 9%. This was calculated

excluding the 6 cases where no incorrect responses were made (no
confidence rating given) and 1 case where the correct confidence rating
was lost due to experimenter error.

For subjects reaching criterion

only, mean confidence for correct responses was 86% for Intuitives and 82%
for Analytics, with incorrect responses generating mean confidences of
72% for Intuitives and 75% for Analytics.

The following table shows

ranges of confidence expressed by subjects.
TABLE VI II
DISTRIBUTION OF CONFIDENCE RATINGS
Intuitive

Analytic

Correct Responses
50% - 75% rating

4

10

76% - 100% rating

31

26

75% rating

16

20

76% - 100% rating

17

13

Incorrect Responses
50% -

22

A MANOVA was perfonned on (a) overall confidence and {b) confidence

on correct minus confidence on incorrect responses for all subjects in
all conditions to see whether differences were present in this measure,
as no differences were found between the groups with other response
measures.

Tests by Pillais, et al produced no significant differences

between intuitive and analytic confidence ratings due to the number of
irrelevant variables or due to any interactions between intuitive and
analytic conditions and the number of irrelevant variables.
Analysis of Strategy
When subjects were asked to articulate what they knew about the
stimuli, to identify the rule, or to verbalize the rule, an accurate
response was considered to be a correct specification of the relevant
and irrelevant variables of the stimuli.
subjects correctly identified the rule.

Twenty-four percent of the
An additional 11% identified a

locally correct rule which specified the relevance or irrelevance of each
variable which was consistent with the feedback they received before
reaching criterion, but which was not general enough to cover all
possible stimuli.

This was verified by checking their rule with the

stimuli they identified to reach the learning criterion.

Thirty-five

percent of the subjects identified a correct or locally correct rule.
Approximately twice as many subjects {47) are clearly
nonverbalizers (did not identify a workable rule) as are verbalizers (25
identified a generally correct or locally correct rule).

Of the

subjects who reached criterion, 60% of the Intuitive and 45% of the
Analytic subjects identified a generally or locally correct rule.

The
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weighted mean across levels of

~omplexity

for the proportion of those

subjects who reached criterion and were able to correctly identify the
rule is 70% for lntuitives and 55% for Analytics.
TABLE IX
ABILITY TO VERBALIZE A CORRECT RULE
2 variables

3 variables

4 variables

Correct Rule

5

1

4

Locally Correct Rule

1

2

1

Correct Rule

3

3

1

Locally Correct Rule

2

0

2

Intuitive

Analytic

Hypothesis testing was performed by most subjects, regardless of
group.

A subject was judged to be testing hypotheses if more than one

rule was used while learning.
groups in this regard:

All subjects could be divided into four

subjects who tested more than one hypothesis

(abandoning an incorrect rule and testing a different one); subjects who
used one basic rule but made adjustments to it so it would "work" with
the stimuli; subjects who reached criterion with one rule only (made no
mention of using any other); and subjects who retained one rule even
though it was recognized as incorrect or who had no rule and ''guessed."
Subjects who reached criterion with one hypothesis cannot be
clearly determined to have tested hypotheses.

Approximately three times
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as many subjects are clearly hypothesis testing (47) as are clearly not

hypothesis testing (14). Of subjects reaching criterion, 45% of
Intutitive and 38% of Analytic subjects clearly tested hypotheses.
Eighty-two percent of the subjects who reached criterion also tested
hypotheses.
TABLE X
EXTENT OF HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Different
Rules

Adjusted
One Rule

One Rule to
Criterion

One Incorrect
or No Rule

Intuitive

16

7

5

8

Analytic

20

4

6

6

A chi-square test was performed to determine whether there was a
relationship between hypothesis testing and identification of the
Subjects were cross-classified in terms of (a) whether

correct rule.

they tested hypotheses and {b) whether they were able to verbalize a
rule.

The 47 subjects who tested hypotheses were classified as 11

verbalizers and 36 nonverbalizers.

Similarly, the 14 subjects who did

not test hypotheses were classified as 0 verbalizers and 14
nonverbalizers.

Subjects who reached criterion with one hypothesis and

a generally or locally correct rule were excluded from this analysis, as
it could not be determined whether they were or were not testing
hypotheses.

Using Yates' correction for continuity to correct for two
2

low cell frequencies (Fisher, 1970), x (1)

= 2.57,

which indicates that
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no significant relationship exists between hypothesis testing and the
ability to identify the correct rule.

CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
1.

Did the experimental manipulation produce intuitive and

analytic learning?
Four measures considering only subjects who reached the learning
criterion demonstrate similar performance in the two conditions:
1

Both Intuitives and Analytics verbalized (the rule) equally
well (70% and 55%).

1

Learning in both conditions produced the same learning
curves as shown by the precriterion proportion of correct
responses (71% and 68%).

1

Both Intuitives and Analytics tested hypotheses to the
same extent (45% and 38%).

1

Confidence in responses was the same for Intuitives as
for Analytics (86% and 82% for correct responses and 72%
and 75% for incorrect responses).

On these bases, it appears that the experimental manipulation failed to
produce different modes of learning.
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2.

What are the effects of complexity on intuitive and analytic

learning?
This question cannot be answered because there was no intuitiveanalytic difference found.

Complexity evidently had no effect on

learning.
It was expected that the more rapidly-paced condition would induce
intuitive learning.

The notion that intuition i-s rapid (Hammond, 1981)

also seems to be present in the studies of experts' chess performance
(de Groot, 1965; Newell and Simon, 1972; Larkin, McDermott, Simon and
Simon, 1980). A rapid pace was also hoped to present material in such
a way that simultaneous processing would occur (Neisser, 1963).

Self-

paced presentation was thought to allow the subject more control over
the task materials, which would allow analytic learning (Hammond, 1981).
It would also promote sequential processing which would facilitate
analytic learning (Neisser, 1963; Bruner, 1960}.

Giving instructions

wh_ich asked the subject only to learn the stimuli was thought to
facili'tate intuitive learning so that subjects would gather informatin
without trying to organize it or without having time to do so due to the
rapid pace of presentation (Hammond, 1981; Heidbreder, 1946; Bruner, 1960).
Instructions to find the rule as well as to learn the stimuli were
expected to encourage analytic learning, as subjects in this condition
used a step-by-step approach to be fully aware of and to organize
the material (Peters, Hammond, and Summers, 1974; Hammond, 1981;
Bruner,

1~60;

Heidbreder, 1946).

The two major findings suggest that learning in this experiment was
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accomplished by essentially intuitive processes:

(a) rate of

presentation did not interact with the number of irrelevant variables in
affecting the number of subjects who reached criterion, and (b) rate of
presentation had no effect on the proportion of correct responses for
those subjects who reached criterion (a measure of rate of learning).
Consistent with this conclusion is the fact that most (65%) of those
subjects who reached criterion were unable to verbalize the rule.

While

the fact that most (82%) of the subjects who reached criterion tested
hypotheses does not support this interpretation, it may not be
inconsistent with it.

It may be possible for intuitive learning to go

on concurrently with hypothesis testing.
A number of factors may have combined to tip the experiment in
favor of intuitive processes.
than symbolic.

First, the stimuli were perceptual rather

Second, the whole list/part list alternation may have

(as intended) induced a substantial intuitive familiarity with
individual stimuli.

And third, the confidence rating task may have

reduced the capacity available for analytic processing.
It would be possible to test the importance of the perceptual
nature of the stimuli by changing to the number equivalents of the bars
instead of showing bar graphs.

If the visual qualities of the bar

graphs are producing the intuitive component of learning in this
experiment (or simply making analytic learning more difficult), having
only numbers should allow the analytic subjects to perform much more
effectively than the intuitive ones.
It would be possible to improve the sensitivity of the experimental
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design by yoking subjects on the basis of stimulus sequence, thus

eliminating random variation due to stimulus and stimulus-sequence
difficulty.
It would be possible to improve learning in the following ways:
(a) by eliminating some blind alleys for subjects through more extensive
instructions; (b) by eliminating confidence ratings, as they are
distracting and provide an interruption between the response given and
the feedback; (c) by limiting the length of the review list to 5
randomly selected stimuli because when the subject has learned a number
of stimuli, the review list becomes so long that it limits the number of
new stimuli introduced; and (d) by having a two- or three-task session,
as pilot studies suggested the presence of a practice effect which was
evidently not produced by the very simple practice stimuli in this
experiment.
Though learning could be improved, there is nothing in the results
of this experiment to indicate that improved learning would produce any
differences between the intuitive and analytic groups.

ANOVA's and

MANOVA's of subjects in this experiment showed no significant effects or
interactions for subjects who did reach criterion.

Without these, it

seems unlikely that complexity would have any more effect on improved
learning than it did in this present procedure.
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